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I.

INTRODUCTION

The importance of the airline industry in modern American economics and
society cannot be overstated. The airlines serviced over 665 million American
passengers in 2000, representing a gross expenditure of over $93 billion.'
Americans rely on air transportation to conduct business, to visit relatives, and
to fulfill their recreational and leisure demands. However, delays caused by
airspace congestion threaten the viability of the airline industry. 2 Disruptions
in our air transportation system, as evidenced in the days, weeks, and months
following the September 11 terrorist attacks, only underline the importance of
the industry. 3
In order to meet the substantial needs of the American public, the air transportation system has, in recent years, demanded more airports, more runways,
and more flight paths.4 Of course, airports and runways require sizeable tracts
* J.D., William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas (2002).

Air Transport Association, 2001 Annual Report Highlights, at 6 (Jan. 13, 2002), available
at http:/www.airlines.org/public/industrylbin/2001annualreport.pdf (last visited Apr. 19,
2003).
2 Air Transport Association, Economics and Statistics, Aviation Infrastructure and Capacity,
Approaching Gridlock (Jan. 13, 2002), available at http://www.airlines.org/public/industry/
display l.asp?nid=l 122 (last visited Apr. 19 , 2003).
3 See, e.g., Dean E. Murphy & Joel Brinkley, A Nation Challenged: The Airports; Rethinking The Securit, At Airports, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2001, at B1.
' See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Transp., 753 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(larger jet aircraft permitted to fly into Jackson Hole Airport in Wyoming); Allison v. Dep't
of Transp., 908 F.2d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (major new airport outside of Denver, Colorado
approved); Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 161 F.3d 569 (9th
Cir. 1998) (expansion of flight paths into Los Angeles International); Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Transp., 222 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2000) (expansion of
Kahului Airport on Island of Maui); Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 269
F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2001) (expansion of air service at commuter airport outside of Boston).
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of land and aircraft make significant amounts of noise.5 The resulting impact
on the environmental integrity of land near airports is obvious.
Recent examples of cities that have experienced the tension between the
air transportation industry and the environment are numerous. These include
Denver, 6 Los Angeles, 7 Jackson Hole, 8 Boston,9 Dallas,' ° and St. Louis.'' The
results of legal battles arising from the construction of new airports and/or the
expansion of existing airports in these cities will be discussed throughout this
note.
Other airport battles have not necessitated litigation, but are no less contentious. For example, Clark County, Nevada, which operates the airport system in and around Las Vegas, has recently proposed the construction of a
second airport to supplement McCarran International. 12 Local authorities have
selected a site in the Ivanpah Valley, which is adjacent to the Mojave National
Preserve, roughly thirty miles from the city.' 3 Environmentalists are closely
watching the development of the project and are poised to take action to prevent the construction of the airport if they feel it will threaten the fragile ecology of the preserve."
A similar situation has recently been resolved near Miami. The closure of
Homestead Air Force Base, following its near destruction in the wake of Hurricane Andrew in 1992, sparked the interest of certain local authorities who
wished to transform the base into a large commercial airport.' 5 Environmentalists objected, citing the detrimental effects, in terms of noise and air pollution,
that such a facility would have on nearby Everglades National Park, Big16
Cypress National Preserve, and Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary.
Although the plan appears to have been quashed by the Air Force, environmentalists are still closely monitoring the activities of local and state authorities.
As will be discussed in Part II, the federal government long ago recognized the adverse effects transportation projects - including airports - can have
on the surrounding environment. One statute that attempts to prevent the
destruction of public parklands was passed in 1966 as part of the Department of
Transportation Act.' 8 Dubbed "Section 4(f)," it is this note's primary focus.
Section 4(f) provides:

'7

The Secretary may approve a transportation program or project ... requiring the use
of publicly owned land of a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl
5 See
6 See
7 See
8 See

generally supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Allison, 908 F.2d 1024.
Morongo Band, 161 F.3d 569.
Sierra Club, 753 F.2d 120.

9 See Save Our Heritage, 269 F.3d 49.
'o See City of Grapevine v. Dep't of Transp., 17 F.3d 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
12

See City of Bridgeton v. Slater, 212 F.3d 448 (8th Cir. 2000).
Christine Dorsey, House OKs Sale of Ivanpah Valley Land for Airport, LAS VEGAS REV.-

J., Oct. 18, 2000, at IA.
13 Id.
14 Id.

15 Tim Breen, Public Lands: Air Force Decides Against Airport Near Everglades, GREENWIRE, Jan.
16

17, 2001.

Id.

17 Id.

18 See Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C.A. § 303 (West 2003).
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refuge of national, State, or local significance, or land of an historic site of national,
State, or local significance (as determined by the Federal, State, or local officials
having jurisdiction over the park, area, refuge, or site) only if (I) there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land; and
(2) the program or project includes all possible planning to minimize harm to the
park, recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from the
use. 19

The protections that § 4(f) affords public parks are primarily found in subsections (1) and (2). Before a court even reviews whether an agency has complied with those sections, however, certain threshold elements must be met.
For instance, the land in question must be publicly owned.20 In addition, to
qualify as a "park," the land must be one of several enumerated types, includ'2
ing "public park[s], recreational area[s], or wildlife and waterfowl refuge[s]. '
Another threshold requirement, the main focus of this note, stems from the
term "Use." 22 The proposed project must "use" parkland in order to trigger the
vigorous requirements of subsections (1) and (2).23 The cases applying § 4(f),
however, reflect a troubling and unsupportable inconsistency. On the one hand,
a "use" has often been identified in cases involving the construction of new
roads, thereby triggering the environmental protections of § 4(f).24 On the
other hand, a "use" has never been identified in airport cases, so § 4(f) has
never been applied to prevent the construction of a new airport or to even curtail the expansion of an existing airport located near an environmentally-sensitive park. 25 The judiciary appears to use two separate standards depending on
whether the proposed project involves a road or an airport. This note argues
that the judiciary has perverted the term "use" in the airport cases, which has
effectively prevented § 4(f) from fulfilling one of its congressionally-intended
purposes: protecting environmentally-sensitive parklands from the damaging
effects of nearby transportation projects, including airports.
This note will examine this paradox by first exploring, in Part II, the legislative history and purpose of § 4(f). Thereafter, this note will begin a detailed
comparison between highway and airport cases. Part III will identify and analyze the major § 4(f) cases involving highway projects. Then, Part IV will
examine cases involving airports, focusing on the differences in the standards
courts apply in those cases. Finally, in Part V, this note will conclude by discussing ways in which this paradox can be remedied. In order to reverse the
unfortunate current trend in airport cases, courts must interpret "use" more
broadly and more flexibly, just as they do in highway cases. Courts must also
reevaluate the standards under which they analyze the impact of noise. The
19 Id. Note that § 4(f) was formerly codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 1653(f) (West 2003).
Falls Rd. Impact Comm., Inc. v. Dole, 581 F. Supp. 678, 686 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (quoting
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 1976)).
21 Id.
22 See Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 1982).
23 See, e.g., Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Adams, 566 F.2d 419 (2d Cir.
1977) (proposed bypass expressway serving Rochester, New York clearly "uses" an 842 acre
public park, but government sufficiently proved that it had considered all feasible and prudent alternatives).
24 See discussion infra Part III.
25 See discussion infra Part IV.
20
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adoption of these suggestions is necessary in order to effectuate Congress'
mandate to protect our nation's parklands from the dangers caused by nearby
airports.
II.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF

§

4(F)

As preliminary foundation, this note will discuss the legislative history
and purpose of § 4(f). It is clear that § 4(f) arose from a growing national
concern in the 1960's over the general deprivation of the environment.2 6 To
forestall man's detrimental impact on ecologically sensitive areas, the federal
government implemented several environmental safeguards during that period.
These included the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as well as
§ 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act.27
Section 4(f)'s policy declaration summarizes this sentiment well. It states
that "special effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges,
and historic sites. ' 2 8 What Congress hoped to accomplish in passing § 4(0) was
the assurance "that in planning highways, railroad rights-of-way, airports, and
other transportation facilities, care will be taken [by the Department of Transportation], to the maximum extent possible, not to interfere with or disturb
established recreational facilities and refuges. ' 29 In so aspiring, "Congress
desired that the effect on parkland and other recreational facilities be fully considered during the planning stages of major new 'facilities. 30
Additional evidence of Congressional intent may be found in the strict
restrictions § 4(f) places on the executive branch of the federal government.
The Secretary of Transportation may approve transportation projects only if he
can meet two burdensome requirements.3 1 First, he must prove that no feasible, prudent alternative to the proposed transportation project exists.3 2 Second,
the proposal must list all possible measures that can mitigate the detrimental
effects the project will have on the park. 33 The Supreme Court has read these
requirements to indicate Congress' strong desire to protect parklands. 4

26 See Stanley D. Olesh, Note, The Roads Through Our Ruins: Archaeology and Section
4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 155, 158-59 (1986);
Barbara Miller, Case Comment, Department of Transportation's Section 4(fi: Paving the
Way Towards Preservation, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 633, 638-39 (1987).
27 Miller, supra note 26, at 638-39.

28 Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C.A. § 303(a) (West 2003).
29 See S. Rep. No. 89-1659 (1966).
30 Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
31 See discussion supra Section 1.
32 Id.

31 Id. See also Matthew Singer, The Whittier Road Case: The Demise of Section 4(f) Since
Overton Park and its Implications for Alternatives Analysis in Environmental Law, 28
ENVTL. L. 729, 732-33 (1998).
31 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412-13 (1971).
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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A "USE"

UNDER

SECTION 4(F) IN HIGHWAY CASES

Through a combination of judicial opinions and administrative regulations, a relatively clear definition of the term "use" has emerged. That definition has been stated fairly consistently for at least the past two decades, as
demonstrated in one of the most significant § 4(f) highway cases yet decided:
Adler v. Lewis. 35 Adler involved the construction of several miles of Interstate
90 through the heart of the Seattle metropolitan area, 36 which opponents argued
would "use" up to fifty local parks. 37 In its decision, the court sanctioned the
Department of Transportation's definition of "use," which stated:
A site is considered "used" whenever land from or buildings on the site are taken by
the proposed project, or whenever the proposed project has significant adverse air,
water, noise, land, accessibility, aesthetic, or other environmental impacts
on or
38
around the site, as per the Stop H-3 Association v. Coleman (opinion).

This definition is very useful because it identifies and defines the concept
39
of "constructive use," to be discussed more thoroughly later in this section.
The court stated that "lt]he term 'use' is to be construed broadly [to incorporate
constructive uses], not limited to the concept of a physical taking."4 0 By incorporating constructive use into the definition, the Alder court indicated the
breadth of § 4(f).
The Adler court, however, also defined the limits of constructive use, and
in so doing, determined that the Secretary of Transportation's decision in this
case - that not all fifty sites would be used by the proposed interstate - was not
clearly erroneous. 4' The court limited the definition of constructive use by
emphasizing the need for courts to look at the significance of the impact on the
park.4 2 The court stated that the term "use" turns on whether the federal transportation action "could create sufficiently serious impacts that would substantially impair the value of the site in terms of its prior significance and
enjoyment." 43 As will be seen, courts in highway cases emphasize language in
Adler that construes the statute broadly to find uses of parks, while courts in
35 675 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1982). See, e.g., Falls Rd. Impact Comm., Inc. v. Dole, 581 F.
Supp. 678 (E.D. Wis. 1984); Coalition Against a Raised Expressway, Inc. v. Dole, 835 F.2d
803 (11th Cir. 1988); Sierra Club v. United States Dep't ofTransp., 664 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D.
Cal. 1987); Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Transp., 753 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Allison v. Dep't of Transp., 908 F.2d 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1990): Morongo Band of Mission
Indians v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 161 F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 1998); Nat'l Parks & Conservation
Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Transp., 222 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2000); Save Our Heritage,
Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 269 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2001); City of Bridgeton v. Slater, 212
F.3d 448 (8th Cir. 2000); City of Grapevine v. Dep't of Transp., 17 F.3d 1502 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
36 Adler, 675 F.2d at 1088.
37 Id. at 1091.

38 Id. at 1092 (citing Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1976) (expressway
built in close proximity to an ancient Hawaiian petroglyph rock)).
31 See discussion infra Part III.B.
40 Adler, 675 F.2d at 1092.
at 1093.
42 Id. at 1092.
41 Id.

43 Id.
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airport cases have construed Adler narrowly by requiring a significant impact
before a constructive use will be found.
Before discussing "constructive use" cases, however, it is important to
fully identify what types of projects will constitute "actual uses," as demonstrated in the famous Overton Park case.
A.

Actual Use

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,4 4 one of the first cases to
interpret § 4(f), is important not only in laying the jurisprudential foundation
for this note, but in laying the foundation for the entire field of environmental
law. In Overton Park, conservationists in Memphis sued under the newlypassed Transportation Act to prevent the construction of Interstate 40 through
the middle of the city's preeminent downtown park.4 5 The park encompassed
342 acres and contained a zoo, golf course, trails, forests, an outdoor theater,
and other recreational and cultural amenities. 4 6 The approved route of the proposed expressway - six lanes in all - was to pass directly through the park,
isolating the zoo and destroying twenty-six acres.4 7
Overton Park represents the most obvious form of "use" contemplated by
§ 4(f): actual, physical placement of a transportation project directly on parkland.48 In that regard, the case does not particularly contribute to this note's
attempt at comprehensively defining the term "use." However, the case is mentioned here because it represents the cornerstone by which further development
of environmental law took place. 49 Overton Park opened the door to using
§ 4(f) and other environmental legislation to prevent unnecessary destruction of
important environmental treasures.5 °
Other courts have held that a major physical taking of a substantial portion
of a park, like that evidenced in Overton Park, is not necessary to implicate
§ 4(f).5 Even the most miniscule taking of any portion of parkland qualifies as
an actual "use." ' 52 For instance, the use of merely fifteen square feet of a
44 401 U.S. 402 (1971).

Id. at 406.
id.
47 id.
48 See also Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Adams, 566 F.2d 419 (2d Cir.
1977) (constructing bypass expressway through a park near Rochester, New York constitutes
45

46

"use" under § 4(f)).

See, e.g., Singer, supra note 33, at 734-35 (discussing the "arbitrary and capricious" test,
the narrow standard of review Overton Park imposed on courts when they review, through
the Administrative Procedure Act, actions of administrative agencies).
5" See, e.g., Olesh, supra note 26, at 173-74 ("[B]y virtue of Overton Park [sic] and its
progeny, section 4(f) is already one of our strongest environmental statutes when applicable."); ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ROBERT H. ABRAMS, WILLIAM GOLDFARB, & ROBERT L.
GRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 5 (2d ed. 1998)
(the use of § 4(f) in Overton Park "pointed the way to subsequent improvements in official
foresight and planning").
5' Township of Springfield v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 1983); Falls Rd. Impact
Comm., Inc. v. Dole, 581 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Wisc. 1984); Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v.
Armbrister, 131 F.3d 1285, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1121 (1998).
52 See Lewis, 702 F.2d at 430.
41
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municipal park would probably suffice.5 3 This broad construction of the statute
is in line with the Supreme Court's holding in Overton Park.54
B.

Constructive Use

If "use" only incorporated transportation projects that actually, physically
traverse parkland, the analysis would be quite simple (and the utility of § 4(f)
would be quite limited). The term, of course, has been interpreted to include
far more. Many courts have found that certain transportation projects, though
not physically located within a park's borders, "constructively" use parkland by
interfering in some way with the park's beneficial attributes." Of primary
importance to the definition, courts hold that such interference must be significant.5 6 Examples of significant interference include: noise, 57 visual obstructions,5 8 and physical barriers to access. 59 The remainder of this section will
explore the many situations in which courts have found constructive uses where
highway projects are at issue.
1. Highways Bordering Parkland
First, highways that border sensitive parklands have often been found to
"constructively use" them under § 4(f). For instance, in Conservation Society
6
of Southern Vermont, Inc. v. Secretary of Transportation,
" the United States
District Court for the District of Vermont concluded that a proposed four-lane,
limited-access expressway bordering a wilderness area affected the wilderness
area to an extent sufficient to constitute a "use" under § 4(f).6 The wilderness
area in question, referred to as the "Lye Brook Backwoods Area," consisted of
roughly 11,000 acres of a remote portion of the Green Mountain National Forest.6 a The court noted that the area was renowned as a peaceful place that
residents of Vermont, including its senior United States Senator, cherished for
its wilderness and solitude.6 3 In concluding that the highway would "use" this
area merely by bordering it, the court rejected the Secretary's attempts to minimize the special environmental attributes of Lye Brook by citing other detri53 Falls Rd. hnpact Comm., 581 F. Supp. at 690-91; see also Arnbrister, 131 F.3d at 1287-

88 (highway using approximately 0.3% of Portage Glacier Recreation Area and approximately 3.3% of Portage Lake Recreation Area).
54 La. Envtl. Soc'y, Inc. v. Coleman, 537 F.2d 79, 84 (5th Cir. 1976).
55 See, e.g., Coalition Against a Raised Expressway, Inc. v. Dole, 835 F.2d 803 (1Ilth Cir.
1988); Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1976); Brooks v. Volpe, 460 F.2d
1193 (9th Cir. 1972); Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Transp., 664 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D.
Cal. 1987); Falls Rd. Impact Comm., 581 F. Supp. 678; Citizens for Mass Transit Against
Freeways v. Brinegar, 357 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Ariz. 1973); Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc.
v. Sec'y of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973).
56 See, e.g., Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 1982).
51 See, e.g., Coalition Against a Raised Expressway, 835 F.2d at 810; Falls Rd. Impact
Conn., 581 F. Supp. at 693.
51 See, e.g., Coalition Against a Raised Expressway, 835 F.2d at 812.
51 See, e.g., Brooks, 460 F.2d at 1194; Falls Rd. hnpact Comm., 581 F. Supp. at 694.
6
61
62
63

362 F. Supp. 627.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 638.
Id.
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mental uses of the area like logging.64 In other words, despite logging and
other non-environment-friendly uses then in place at Lye Brook, the court held
that a new highway would significantly impact the area.65
The Lye Brook court relied heavily on another "use" case involving a proposed highway that, if constructed, would have bordered a parkland.66 In
Brooks v. Volpe, 6 7 conservationists sued under § 18(a) of the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1968, that, like § 4(f), requires the "use" of a sensitive area by
a transportation project in order to trigger the statute's environmental protection
provisions. 68 The court held that the encirclement of the Denny Creek Campground, located in an alpine forest near the summit of Snoqualmie Pass in
Washington State, constituted a "use" under the Highway Act. 6 9 Relying on
Overton Park, the court emphasized the Supreme Court's mandate to construe
§ 4(f), including the word "use," "broadly... in cases in which environmental
This case recognizes two cateimpact appears to be a substantial question."'
gories of "constructive use:" (1) projects that border parkland and (2) projects
that restrict access to parkland. The latter is the subject of the next
subsection. 7
It is important to note that the provisions of § 4(f) are not necessarily
triggered simply because a proposed transportation project is near a parkland.
7' 2
In Adler, the Ninth Circuit held that proximity alone is not a "crucial factor."
The court emphasized that distance was not really a factor in and of itself, but,
combined with the adverse impact or impairment that the transportation project
may have on the protected site, it might become important.13 The court distinguished Stop H-3 Association v. Coleman,7 4 where the Ninth Circuit had earlier
found that the close proximity of a highway to ancient Hawaiian petroglyphs
Note, however, that, according to at least one
constituted a constructive use.
court, if the park is "immediately adjacent" to the highway, § 4(f) is triggered
because of presumed impacts.7 6

64 Id. at 639.
65 Id.
66 See id. (citing Brooks, 460 F.2d 1193).
67 460 F.2d 1193.
68 Id. at 1194 (construing Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 § 18(a), 23 U.S.C. § 138

(2000)).
69 /d.
70

Id. (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 (1971)).

71 See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
72

Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 1982).

73 Id. at 1091-92.
74 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1976).
75 Id. at 445.

Citizens for Mass Transit Against Freeways v. Brinegar, 357 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (D.
Ariz. 1973) (proposed section of Interstate 10 through downtown Phoenix located adjacent
76

to a Berney Park).
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Highways Restricting Access to Parkland

In Falls Road Impact Committee, Inc. v. Dole,77 a rare case involving a
highway that was found not to use parkland, a federal district court in Wisconsin held that conservationists failed to prove that restricted access to a municipal park during the widening of a road and construction of a bridge constituted
a constructive use. 7 8 Construction was to have been completed over the course
of only 80-100 days.79 In addition, sidewalks that had not existed prior to the
construction project were found to actually increase accessibility to the park. 80
Given those facts, the court found accessibility problems too insignificant to
qualify as a constructive use. 8'
The court in Brooks v. Volpe, 82 by contrast, found access sufficiently
impaired to justify a finding of a constructive use. To differentiate Brooks with
Falls Road, it may have been important in the courts' reasoning that the campground in Brooks had been located in a quiet forest setting, far from other manmade sounds. The construction of the interstate on either side of the campground would clearly disrupt the previous ability to access and enjoy the area.
In contrast, the park in Falls Road was an urban park, already located near
streets. In addition, the access problem cited by the plaintiffs in Falls Road
was to be only temporary, while the interstate would obviously restrict access
to the campground far more permanently. In any case, the judiciary has clearly
found accessibility an attribute whose impairment can constitute a constructive
use.
3.

Highways Disrupting Parkland Through Noise

Probably the most credible claim made by the plaintiffs in Falls Road,
however, pertained to the noise impact the newly-widened road would have on
the park. Local authorities predicted that increased traffic - including many
more trucks - would increase the average decibel level to 65.5.83 However,
that level represented an increase of only 6.5 - 7.5 decibels (or roughly ten
percent) over the levels measured prior to construction. In addition, the design
noise level, which generally represents the "upper level of acceptable noise" for
581 F. Supp. 678, 694 (E.D. Wisc. 1984). This case also involved the question of
whether an actual use of the parkland would occur if a mere fifteen square feet of parkland
17

were taken by the proposed road. The court stated that it probably would.
79 Id. at 694.
79 Id.
81

Id. at 692-93.
Id. at 694.

82

460 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1972).

80

83 Falls Rd. Inpact Comm., 581 F. Supp. at 693. For reference, note that seventy-five

decibels is "the equivalent of a household vacuum cleaner operating five to six feet away."
Allison v. Dep't of Transp., 908 F.2d 1024, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Other relevant comparisons include the following: A quiet office or library produces roughly forty decibels, while a
large office produces fifty decibels. League for the Hard of Hearing, Noise Center: Noise
Levels in Our Environment Fact Sheet, available at http/lwww.lhh.org/noise/decibel.htm

(last visited Apr. 19, 2003). A coffee percolator equates to fifty-five decibels, while freeway
traffic is seventy. Id. Conversational speech from about one foot away produces sixty decibels, while a busy street or small orchestra produce roughly sixty-five. Coolmath, Decibel
Levels, available at http//www.coolmath.com/decibelsl.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
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a "particular classification of human activity," at the park had been set at 67
decibels, 1.5 decibels higher than the projected level after the completion of the
project. 84 The court found this evidence too inconclusive to prove that the
noise effects would be substantial. 85 Therefore, on this issue, as well, the court
found no constructive use.8 6
87
By comparison, in CoalitionAgainst a Raised Expressway, Inc. v. Dole,
the Eleventh Circuit found that noise did cause a constructive use. 88 The facts
in that case, however, were far more egregious than in Falls Road. The case
arose due to the proposed construction of an interchange connecting two major
interstate highways in downtown Mobile, Alabama.89 The proposal required
the construction of several seventeen-foot concrete pillars within close proximity, and within sight, of three important historical buildings covered by § 4(f).9"
The court found that a significant increase in noise would result from the
interchange. Citing the government's final Environmental Impact Statement,
noise "would rise to between seventy-five and eighty decibels," a level "substantially greater than the Environmental Protection Agency's goal of fifty-five
decibels." 9 '
Although the court in Raised Expressway clearly found noise to be a significant factor, it is important to note that it did not reach a decision on whether
noise alone would be sufficient. The court held that the combination of noise,
proximity, and unsightliness made the interchange a sufficient enough "use" to
trigger the requirements of § 4(f).92
4. Highways Disrupting Parkland Through Visual Obstructions or
UnpleasantAesthetics
As indicated in Raised Expressway, unsightliness may be a significant factor in a court's determination that a transportation project constructively uses
parkland. The Eleventh Circuit in that case noted that the elevation of the
interchange would impair the view, both from downtown looking towards the
Mobile River and from the river looking back towards the historic architecture
may not have been enough, but
of downtown. 93 Again, visual aesthetics alone 94
persuasive.
factor
the
found
certainly
the court
Falls Road helps illustrate the sort of facts found insufficient, by themselves, to constitute a constructive use due to visual unpleasantness. 9 5 In that
84

Id at 693.

85 Id.at 694.
86

i.

87 835 F.2d 803 (11 th Cir. 1988).

Id. at 812.
Id. at 805.
" Id. at 811. The historic sights included Mobile City Hall, a National Historic Landmark;
the G.M. & 0. Railroad Terminal, an architectural treasure listed on the National Register of
Historic Places; and Government Street Park, a small parkland along the nearby Mobile
River. Id.
9' Id. at 811-812.
92 Id. at 812.
88

89

93

Id.

94 Id.

95 581 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Wis. 1984); see discussion supra Parts III.B.2 and II.B.3.
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case, neither increased traffic nor the loss of vegetation affected the aesthetic
value of the park to a significant enough degree to trigger § 4(f).96
97
In Sierra Club v. United States Department of Transportation,
however,
the detrimental aesthetic impact of a proposed highway was enough, by itself,
to convince the court to invoke § 4(f).98 McNee Ranch State Park is located in
central California along the Pacific coast. 99 The court noted that the park was
primarily renowned for its scenic qualities."o The rugged mountainous terrain
and views of the ocean made the scenery from the park's many overlooks
"quite spectacular."''
In contrast with the unspoiled nature of the park's visual features, the proposed freeway would have caused many unpleasant scars
on the sides of the park's mountain ranges. 10 2 These were to include seven
large "cuts" and "a number of 'fill' slopes, the largest of which would be 250
feet high."'0 3 In addition to the unsightly cuts and fill slopes, the highway
itself would have been visible." The court found that the aesthetic impact on
campers, hikers, and sightseers would have been "significant[ly] adverse," and
the court consequently held that the highway would constructively use the
05
park.'
5.

Other Considerations

The Sierra Club case is interesting because it cites other factors that may
adversely impact a park to a degree sufficient to constitute a "use" for purposes
of § 4(f). In particular, the court noted that the highway would have significantly impaired the park's recreational attributes."° Hiking trails would have
been relocated and the proximity of the road would have destroyed the
"unspoiled wilderness through which the hikers now walk."'01 7
In addition, the court cited the adverse effect the highway would have had
on the park's wildlife. The "barrier effect" created by the highway would have
prevented certain wildlife from accessing important sections of their habitat,
thereby leading to a decline in wildlife populations and the possibility of complete extinction for particular species from certain areas of the park.' 08 Judicial
concern for wildlife will resurface in this note's later discussion of airport

cases. 109
96 Falls Rd. Impact Comm., 581 F. Supp. at 694.

664 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
Id. at 1330.
99 See id. at 1327.
'0 Id. at 1331.
01 Id.
97

98

102

See id.

103

Id. at 1330-31.

'04

id. at 1331.

1o5

Id.

106

Id. at 1330-3 1.
Id.
Id.

107
108

109 See discussion infra Part 1V.B.2.
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C. Summary of Highway Cases

As the highway cases reveal, a broad array of constructive use situations
have been identified by the courts. Whether alone or in combination with other
factors, these situations certainly include those where highways border parkland,' o restrict access to parkland,' detrimentally affect the visual aesthetics
of parkland," 2 or heighten noise in parkland." 3 These situations may also
include those where wildlife or recreational opportunities are detrimentally
affected.'14 Perhaps surprisingly, these situations appear to trigger § 4(f) only
when the transportation project is a highway. When an airport is involved, as
the next Part of this note will show, courts appear far less ready to construe the
facts in favor of finding a "use," constructive or otherwise.
IV.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A "USE" UNDER
SECTION 4(F) IN NEW AIRPORT AND AIRPORT EXPANSION CASES

A.

Introduction

Courts interpreting § 4(f) in an airport context generally acknowledge the
broad definition of the term "use" as identified in highway cases.' 1 5 In other
words, the "constructive use" theory applies to airport projects as well as highway projects. For example, the D.C. Circuit, in Allison v. Department of
Transportation, stated: [A] project which respects a park's territorial integrity
may still, by means of noise, air pollution and general unsightliness, dissipate
aesthetic value, crush its wildlife, defoliate its vegetation, and "take" it in every
practical sense. 16
However, despite that acknowledgment and others like it,'7 the same
court is very reluctant to apply the definition in the same way it did in highway
cases. The Allison court, for instance, comprehensively outlined the judiciary's
interpretation of the term "use," as it applies in airport cases, when it stated:
The "use" of parklands within the meaning of section 4(f) includes not only actual,
physical takings of such lands but also significant adverse indirect impacts as well.
.. At the same time, "not ...every change within park boundaries constitutes a
"O See, e.g., Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1976); Brooks v. Volpe,
460 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1972); Citizens for Mass Transit Against Freeways v. Brinegar, 357
F. Supp. 1269 (D. Ariz. 1973); Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt., Inc. v. Sec'y of Transp., 362 F.
Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973).
"' See, e.g., Falls Rd. Impact Comm., Inc. v. Dole, 581 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
112 See, e.g., Coalition Against a Raised Expressway, Inc. v. Dole, 835 F.2d 803 (11 th Cir.
1988); Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Transp., 664 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
"13 See, e.g., Coalition Against a Raised Expressway, 835 F.2d 803; Falls Rd. Impact
Comm., 581 F. Supp. 678.
114 Sierra Club, 664 F. Supp. 1324.
15 See, e.g., Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 161 F.3d 569, 583
(9th Cir 1998) (quoting the definition of "use" found in Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1092
(9th Cir. 1982)).
116 Allison v. Dep't of Transp., 908 F.2d 1024, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting D.C. Fed'n
of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
117See, e.g., Morongo Band, 161 F.3d at 583; Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation
Admin.. 269 F.3d 49. 58 (lst Cir. 2001).
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use" of section 4(f) lands. No "use" will be deemed to have occurred where an
action will have only an insignificant effect on the existing use of protected lands. 118

As this excerpt indicates, courts in airport cases have emphasized the far
more narrow interpretation of "use" that was identified in Adler: no "use" will
be found if "no significant impact" on the park can be identified." 9 As the
survey of airport cases outlined below will reveal, opponents of airport projects
have never overcome this hurdle.' 0 Judicial application of § 4(f) has never
effectively protected a park of local, state, or federal significance from the

intrusions of a nearby airport.'
B.

ChronologicalDiscussion of Airport Cases
1.

Jackson Hole Airport and Grand Teton National Park

One of the first cases in which airport opponents attempted to use § 4(f) to
protect a nearby park arose from a controversy involving the airport in Jackson
Hole, Wyoming, located just outside Grand Teton National Park.' 2 2 Grand
Teton is one of America's most treasured parks. Located just south of Yellowstone, the park's primary attraction is the Grand Teton mountain range, a shear
wall of solid granite rising 7,000 feet from the valley below, completely unobstructed by smaller foothills.' 23 Vast forests and large pristine lakes offer an
abundance of recreational opportunities. 124 Yet, incredibly, a relatively large
commercial airport that services the tourist and 25skiing center of Jackson Hole is
located not near but actually within the park.1
The controversy arose in 1983 when the FAA approved the use of Boeing
737 passenger jets from the airport, a type of aircraft not previously used on a
regular basis at Jackson Hole. 126 This prompted the Sierra Club to allege a
violation of § 4(f) and other laws. 127 The Sierra Club argued that the use of
118 Allison, 908 F.2d at 1028 (quoting Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 826 F.2d
60, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
119 Adler, 675 F.2d at 1092.
12o The only case in which a court has tacitly agreed that a use occurred in an airport context
is Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In that case,
however, the court did not directly address the issue, as it had no opportunity to do so. The
FAA conceded that its approval of the expansion of the Toledo Airport, which would cause
nighttime noise levels at a nearby campground to increase by approximately ten to fifteen
decibels, would "use" parkland. Id. at 203. However, the FAA argued that there was no
feasible alternative to the airport's "use" of the campground. Id.
121 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Transp., 753 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Allison, 908 F.2d 1024; Morongo Band, 161 F.3d 569; Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v.
United States Dep't of Transp., 222 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2000); Save Our Heritage, 269 F.3d
49; City of Bridgeton v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 212 F.3d 448 (8th Cir. 2000); City of Grapevine v. Dep't of Transp., 17 F.3d 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
122 Sierra Club, 753 F.2d at 122.
123 FODOR'S NATIONAL PARKS OF THE WEST: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE

31

BEST-LOVED

179
(Amy McConnell ed., 3d ed. 1996).
124 Id. at 179-80.
125 The Jackson Hole Airport, in fact, is "the only airport in this country located within the
NATIONAL PARKS AND MONUMENTS

IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES AND CANADA

boundaries of a National park." Sierra Club, 753 F.2d at 122.
126 Id. at 122-23.
127 Id. at 122.
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commercial jets, where only propeller aircraft had been used in the past, constituted a "constructive use" of the park.' 28 Sierra Club's argument analogized
the expansion of air service to the highway projects at issue in Brooks, Adler,
and Conservation Society of Southern Vermont,' 29 which were held to constitute constructive uses of the parks in those cases. 130 The D.C. Circuit, however, rejected the argument, holding those cases inapposite since "[e]ach either
involve[d] a new and actual use of parkland, or [an] activity on adjoining land
that would have a severe physical impact on the parkland."'' The court found
that the addition of commercial jets was not, in fact, a "new" use, since the
airport had been in operation prior to Grand Teton's designation as protected
land. 3' 2 The court further noted that other aircraft, including private jets,' 3 3
had used the airport for many years prior to the action at hand. 134 Finally, the
court cited Adler, 35 finding the type of flight scheduling change at issue
"insignificant" and reasoned that Congress did not intend such minor changes
to rise to the level of a § 4(f) "use."' 1 36 The court's decision, in effect, opened
at both Grand
the door to further development, setting a regrettable precedent
37
Teton and other airports located next to sensitive parklands.1
2.

Denver's Stapleton Airport and Barr Lake State Park

Another important case, Allison v. Department of Transportation,
involved the construction of one of the largest commercial airports in the country, Denver's new Stapleton Airport. 138 Denver's previous airport had long
been considered inadequate; as a result, the local government explored alternatives for the placement of a new facility throughout the late 1970s and
1980s. ' Denver settled on a location thirteen miles from the previous airport,
which placed the new facility near a recreational park and wildlife refuge called
residents sued to prevent construction of the
Barr Lake State Park.' 4 ° 14Local
1
new airport under § 4(f).
In upholding the FAA's determination that the new facility would not
"use" Barr Lake, the court noted that the park's location was within close proximity to the former airport and, therefore, already suffered from noticeable air128
129
130

131
132

Id. at 130.
See discussion supra Part III.
Sierra Club, 753 F.2d at 130.
Id.

Id.

133 The court summarily states that private jets at Jackson Hole Airport "create far more

cumulative noise than commercial jets." Id.
134 Id.

115 See discussion supra Part III. The Adler court emphasized the significance of the
impact when analyzing whether a proposed action would constructively "use" a parkland.
136 Sierra Club, 753 F.2d at 130.
117 Jackson Hole Airport itself continues to be the source of potential action under § 4(f). In
1998, the FAA proposed the expansion of the runway, citing safety issues. See Mark Peterson, Rocky Mountain Regional Report, NATIONAL PARKS, Nov. I, 1998, at 18.
138 Allison v. Dep't of Transp., 908 F.2d 1024, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
139

Id. at 1026-27.

140

Id.

141

id. at 1027.
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craft noise. 1 4 2 Relying heavily on its decision in Jackson Hole, 4 3 the court
reasoned that the overall amount of noise would be roughly the same after the
new airport's completion.' 44 To make that determination, the court relied on
FAA noise impact studies that analyzed differences in noise levels both cumulatively (the overall amount of noise audible at the park as a whole) and episodically (the amount of time various corners of the park experience high levels of
noise for short periods). 145 In both cases, the FAA garnered sufficient evidence
46
to support their conclusion that no noticeable increase in noise would occur.1
The court thereby held that the new Stapleton would not significantly impact
the park and would, therefore, not "use" the park under § 4(f).147
Despite the holding in Allison, environmentalists concerned about the
effect of noise on wildlife could find some encouragement in dicta about the
faultiness of the FAA's reliance on federal noise regulations. "Part 150" is a
federal guideline that identifies the maximum noise level, measured in decibels,
acceptable in certain situations.'48 In "recreational" situations, which include
nature exhibits, zoos, amusements, parks, resorts, golf courses, and riding stables, seventy decibels is acceptable under Part 150.149 In Allison, the FAA
deemed Barr Lake State Park "recreational" and then proceeded to use the standards under Part 150 to determine that the noise level at the park after the new
facility was built would be acceptable. 150 The court found the FAA's categorization of the park as "recreational" flawed.' 5 ' The court differentiated purely
"recreational" areas, which involve the use of land by humans, with "refuges,"
which involve the use of land by wildlife.' 52 According to the court, seventy
decibels could be appropriate for amusement parks and golf courses, but may
be completely inappropriate for an area dedicated to providing a natural habitat
for wildlife.' 53 Even though the court's decision did not turn on the FAA's
misuse of Part 150, it still provides useful insight into how the judiciary may
54
rule upon different facts.'
142

Id. at 1028.

143 See Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 753 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1985), discussed

supra Part IV.B.1.
'" Allison, 908 F.2d at 1030-31.
145 Id.
146 The FAA's noise level contour lines showed that "Barr Lake State Park will remain well
outside the [60 decibel] noise contour," which meant that there would be "no significant
difference in the impact on Barr Lake of the noise resulting from operations at the two
airports." Id. at 1030. In addition, at two of the three locations within the park analyzed by
the FAA, noise exposure would actually decrease, Id. However, the court also noted that at
the third location, episodic noise exposure would increase by three and a half minutes per
day. Id. In addition, another location just outside the park would begin experiencing noise
where it previously had not. Id. The court dismissed these increases, holding that "overall,"
noise would actually decrease once the airport relocated. Id. at 1030-31.
147
148

14'

Id. at 1030-31.
14 C.F.R. § 150.1 (2003).

Id. at Appendix A, Table 1.

'1o Allison, 908 F.2d at 1029.
151
152
153

154

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1028-29.
See discussion infra Part IV.C for additional case law discussing the relevance of Part

150 i'n § 4(f) actions. See also discussion infra Part V.B (argument that Part 150 is inappli-
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LAX and the Morongo Band of Mission Indians

As in the cases involving both Jackson Hole and Stapleton, the court in
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FederalAviation Administration155 held
that modifications to a city's air transportation system did not constitute a suffi156
ciently significant impact to implicate the provisions of § 4(f).
The modification at issue in Morongo involved the eastern flight path into
Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). 157 In 1997, the FAA, citing safety
and efficiency, decided the flight pattern needed to be moved eight miles to the
south. 158 This meant that approximately 180 flights per day would fly directly
over the Morongo Reservation, located 90 miles east of the airport.' 59 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found no "use" of the reservation because the
levels of noise cited in the FAA's noise analysis "would not be 'loud enough to
create significant impacts anywhere along [ ] the proposed alternative [flight]
routes. . ."16o In its discussion of the Morongo Band's claims under the
National Environmental Policy Act, the court had already concluded that the
Band had failed to prove that the FAA's methodologies for determining what
level of noise would constitute a "significant impact" were arbitrary or capricious. 6 ' Although the facts in this case may not invite the sort of environmental sympathy inherent in a case like Jackson Hole, 162 the decision does indicate
the judiciary's continued reliance on "no significant impact" analysis and its
reluctance to find a "use" under § 4(f) where an airport is concerned.
'

4.

Kahului Airport and Haleakala National Park

In 2000, the National Parks & Conservation Association (NPCA) challenged the expansion of the Kahului airport on the island of Maui under
§ 4(f). 1 6 3 The NPCA argued that the expansion would constitute a "use" by
perpetuating the introduction of non-native plant and animal species, which
would disrupt the fragile ecosystem of Haleakala National Park. 1 64 The court
rejected the claim, holding the NPCA could not demonstrate that the expansion
would allow the introduction of so many alien species as to significantly impact
the environmental value of the park. 16 5 As in other airport cases, the court here
emphasized what it deemed an insignificant potential impact and refused to
make use of the judicial creativity evident in some of the highway cases.
cable in § 4(f) cases and that courts should, therefore, refrain from relying on Part 150 to
support decisions that find noise increases too insignificant to constitute constructive uses).
155 161 F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 1998).
'56 Id. at 583.
157 Id. at 572-73.
158

Id.

159

Id. at 572.

Id. at 583. Note also that the Morongo Court did not use Part 150 in its noise analysis.
Id. at 577-79.
162 See discussion supra Part IV (Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Transp., 753 F.2d
120 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
163 Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Transp., 222 F.3d 677, 67879 (9th Cir. 2000).
'64 Id. at 679.
165 Id. at 682.
160
161
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Hanscom Field and Minute Man National Historic Park

In the most recent court decision involving § 4(f), the court in Save Our
Heritage,Inc. v. FederalAviation Administration'66 held that the expansion of
air service from a small commuter airport would have only a de minimus effect
on nearby parks, thus eliminating the necessity to comply with § 4(f).167
The case involved the expansion of air service from Hanscom Field, a
relatively small airport about fifteen miles from Boston. 16 ' Local officials had
been allowing increases in service to and from Hanscom in an effort to relieve
congestion at Boston's major airport, Logan International. 169 A commuter airline, Shuttle America, which had been operating from the Hanscom Field for
several years, wished to expand its service from Hanscom by adding flights
serving New York's LaGuardia Airport.' 7 ° Conservationists protested on the
basis of the airport's close proximity to Minute Man National Historic Park,
Walden Pond, and the historic homes of several celebrated American
authors. 171
In finding the effect of the additional flights environmentally insignificant,
the court cited the fact that the addition of only 10 flights per day, at an airport
that "handled just under 100,000 flights" per year, equated to a mere two and a
half percent increase in overall flights.' 7 2 The court minimized the effect that
the additional flights would have on ground traffic, finding that the flight times
would occur at "non-peak periods where existing levels are light."' 7 3 The court
also minimized the noise effects that larger aircraft, which were to be used in
1 74
the new LaGuardia service, would have on the overall noisiness of the area;
in addition, the court found that turbo-prop aircraft may be more quiet than the
private jets that had already been using the field for years.1 75 Based on this
analysis, the court found the FAA's noise, air pollution, and surface traffic
studies persuasive enough to establish that the
new service would have a de
176
minimus effect on the surrounding parklands.
C.

Other Airport Cases Involving Part 150's Noise Guidelines
As first discussed previously in Part IV of this note, judicial decisions
regarding whether a significant noise impact rises to the level of a constructive
use under § 4(f) may turn on Part 150 of the FAA's airport noise regulations,
177
which lists the maximum decibel levels recommended at various locations.
As might be expected, reviewing courts have never overturned a case in which
166

269 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2001).

Id. at 58-60. In stating the de minimus test, the First Circuit relied on Adler v. Lewis.
Id. at 58-89. See discussion supra Part III.
168 Id. at 53-55.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 58.
173 Id.
174 Id. Shuttle America planned to use its fifty-passenger turbo-prop aircraft for the
LaGuardia service.
175 id. at 58.
176 Id. at 59-61.
177 See Allison v. Dep't of Transp., 908 F.2d 1024 (1990).
167
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the FAA uses Part 150 to deem the noise created by a proposed transportation
project "insignificant."
For example, where flights to and from St. Louis' Lambert Airport were to
create noise levels of less than sixty-five decibels (the noise level audible on a
busy street or created by a small orchestra) 7 8 over an historic district, the FAA
declared the impact insignificant under Part 150.179 The court recognized the
dicta from Allison, which declined to apply Part 150 standards to wildlife refuges,' 8 ° but since the park in question was merely historic in nature, the court
upheld the FAA's determination. 8' Similarly, in City of Grapevine v. Department of Transportation, the sixty-five decibel standard was upheld when
applied to historic homes located under flight patterns approaching Dallas-Fort
Worth International Airport.' 82 Importantly, however, the Grapevine court
noted that the sixty-five decibel level may not be applicable to certain historic
parks, especially those that serve the specific purpose of "convey[ing] the
atmosphere of rural life in an earlier (and presumably a quieter) century."' 83
The court in Save our Heritage184 also mentioned Part 150, noting that
increases in flights from Hanscom Field would cumulatively increase noise
levels by only one percent over the current sixty-five decibel level, which
would still be "compatible with all land uses."' 85 The court further noted that
the sensitive parklands near the airport, including Minute Man National Historic Park and Walden Woods, would lie outside the fifty-five decibel contour
line.' 86 The court presumably found that noise level acceptable. 8 7
D.

Summary of Airport Cases

Reconciling § 4(f) cases involving airports is actually not a very difficult
task. In sum, courts apply the "no significant impact" test,'88 giving it a very
broad and sweeping interpretation, which effectively makes the finding of a
"use" nearly impossible.' 8 9 To find no significant impact, courts primarily
employ a method of comparison. Courts compare the parkland before and after
the airport modification. 90 Since airports, in one form or another, have been
there first in each of these cases, a prior history of adverse effects has always
178 League for the Hard of Hearing, Noise Center, Noise Levels in Our Environment Fact
Sheet, available at http://www.lhh.org/noise/decibel.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
'79

City of Bridgeton v. Slater, 212 F.3d 448, 460-62 (8th Cir. 2000).

182

17 F.3d 1502, 1507-08 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

180 See discussion supra Part'IV.B.2.
181 City of Bridgeton, 212 F.3d at 460-62.
183 Id. at 1508.

"8 See discussion supra Part IV.B.5.

185 Save our Heritage, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 269 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2001).
186
187

Id. at 59.
Id.

188 See discussion supra Part III (Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1982)).
189 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Transp., 753 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Allison v. Dep't of Transp., 908 F.2d 1024 (1990); Morongo Band of Mission Indians v.
Fed. Aviation Admin., 161 F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 1998); Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v.
United States Dep't of Transp., 222 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2000); Save Our Heritage, 269 F.3d
49; City of Bridgeton, 212 F.3d 448; City of Grapevine, 17 F.3d 1502.
'90 See, e.g., Sierra Club, 753 F.2d 120; Allison, 908 F.2d 1024; Morongo Band, 161 F.3d
569; Save Our Heritage, 269 F.3d 49.
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been proven. Therefore, opponents of airport expansions begin their quest to
utilize § 4(f) at a disadvantage. In other words, to prove a "use" according to
the comparison method, proponents must show that the change will have a
significantly adverse effect on the parkland over and above the current effect
already in evidence.
The importance of this critical factor cannot be overstated. The result of
the judiciary's over-reliance on a comparison between adverse impacts,
existing before and after airport projects are implemented, is apparent in the
disposition of § 4(f) airport cases. The judiciary's "no significant impact"
comparison methodology has effectively prevented environmentalists from
using § 4(f) to prevent the construction or expansion of airports. This result
sharply contradicts both judicial opinions interpreting § 4(f) in highway contexts and, more importantly, Congressional intent that § 4(f) be applied
broadly. The next Part of this note outlines various suggestions to remedy this
inconsistency in the law.
V.

SUGGESTIONS FOR CORRECTING THE JUDICIARY'S PERVERSION OF THE
TERM "USE" IN FUTURE AIRPORT CASES

In order for § 4(f) to serve a more effective role in protecting the environment in airport-related cases, courts must adopt a more pro-environment interpretation of the term "use." Two remedies, both entirely within the scope of
the judiciary's power, should be employed to effectuate a positive change in
§ 4(f) airport jurisprudence. First, courts should utilize the same reasoning in
airport cases that they already utilize in highway cases. Second, courts should
discontinue their reliance on Part 150, which inevitably serves only to minimize
the noise impact of airports on parklands. If the judiciary cannot resolve the
inconsistencies it has created in § 4(f) jurisprudence, Congress should step in
and clarify its intention to treat highway projects the same as airport projects.
A. The Judiciary Should Use the Same Rationale in Airport Cases as
Already Used in Highway Cases
Judicial interpretation of § 4(f) has diverged into two completely separate
lines of cases: one for airports and one for highways. There is, however, no
basis in the legislative history for doing so. As the legislative history of § 4(f)
indicates, Congress intended the statute to encompass all sorts of "transportation projects," including both highways and airports.' 91 In fact, the statute specifically mentions both highways and airports. 192 The legislative record
contains no indication that Congress meant for different types of transportation
projects to be treated differently.' 93 If logic were the only criterion in fact,
airports should probably he held to an even higher standard than highways,
since their impact is more far reaching than that of highways. Airports not only
occupy more land, but they create far more noise. That noise stretches into
areas not only adjacent to the airport, but for miles around. Neither the legisla191 See discussion supra Part II.
192 See discussion supra Part t.
19

See discussion supra Part II.
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tive history nor the plain language of § 4(f) justifies the disparate treatment
accorded airport and highway cases.
Likewise, the disparity cannot be justified by distinguishing the factual
circumstances between airport and highway cases. If anything, logic would
dictate that the facts in many airport cases would be more likely to trigger
§ 4(f) than the facts from some of the highway cases. For instance, the court in
Coalition Against a Raised Expressway protected a city hall, a railroad station
and a small park, all of which were already located in the middle of a busy
downtown area.' 9 4 The court in Grand Teton, on the other hand, failed to
protect a large national park, one of the nation's most valued natural wonderlands, from the noisy intrusion and air pollution associated with 737 jetliners.' 9 5 In effect, the judiciary has told us that the noise and visual
obstructions created by concrete pillars in the center of a city constitute a "use"
under § 4(f), while the noise and air pollution associated with a never-beforeused type of large commercial jetliner, flying over what was intended to be one
of the most peaceful and "wild" places in the entire country, do not constitute a
"use." The disparate rationale used by these courts cannot be reconciled.
Similarly, the McNee Ranch Court protected wildlife from the potential
threat of decreased habitat at a state park, 196 while the court in the Haleakala
case failed to protect the extremely fragile ecosystem at Haleakala National
Park from the possibility of complete destruction.' 9 7 A state park and its wildlife in central California are certainly worthy of protection from the intrusions
of a highway. But then, one wonders why a court would not use the same
reasoning to protect the unique flora and fauna of a national park from the
threat of extinction posed by alien species introduced from an increase in international air traffic. Had the court in the Haleakala case used the same logic
employed by the McNee Ranch court, the result would almost certainly have
been different. Courts must recognize this paradox in § 4(f) case law, and then
reexamine their reasoning to be more consistent with the intent of the Department of Transportation Act. Once they do so, they will recognize that their
decisions in airport cases should coincide more closely with their decisions in
highway cases.
The most effective means by which the judiciary could solve the paradox
problem would be to curtail their use of the "significance of the impact" test
from Adler v. Lewis. 1 9 8 Courts over rely on this test in airport cases, which has
the effect of abrogating the cumulative impact of several smaller "expansions"
at a given airport. '99 Grand Teton and Hanscom Field exemplify the illegitimacy of judicial reliance on this test. In those cases, the courts found that the
impact, before and after the proposed expansion of air service, would not be
significant enough to constitute a constructive use. 20 0 In so doing, the courts
194 See discussion supra Part III.B.3.

195 See discussion supra Part IV.B.1 (Sierra Club v. United States Dep't of Transp., 753
F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
196 See discussion supra Part III.B.4 (Sierra Club, 753 F.2d 120).
197 See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
198

See discussion supra Part III.

199 See discussion supra Part IV.D.

Sierra Club, 753 F.2d at 130; Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 269 F.3d
49 (ist Cir. 2001).
200
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ignored the current state of the parks in question. The effect of any one expansion will not be great when compared to the state of the park immediately
preceding the single expansion. However, such reasoning is illogical, given
that when one looks at the cumulative impact of years and years of expansion,
the effect on a park can indeed be significant.
Similar attempts to avoid environmental laws have been identified in cases
involving the National Environmental Policy Act20 that require Environmental
Impact Statements whenever major federal projects impact environmentallysensitive areas.2 °2 By segmenting a large project into several smaller projects,
proponents
hope to get around the requirement by arguing the project is not
"major.''2 °3 Although not necessarily in the majority, a few courts have
rejected these attempts to "evade" the statute by such "bootstrapping. ' 204
Courts hearing § 4(f) airport cases should follow suit when looking at the
cumulative impact of ongoing airport expansionism because the results are
identical. The intent and purpose of environmental regulation is thwarted by
looking only at the immediate consequence of a proposed project and failing to
see the "big picture."
B.

JudicialReliance on Part 150 in § 4(f) Cases Should Be Abandoned

As evidenced in each of the § 4(f) cases discussed in Part IV of this note,
noise consistently plays a major role in the legal determination of whether an
airport constructively uses nearby parkland. The courts, through the deference
they generally accord the FAA, often cite Part 150 in reaching a conclusion that
noise from an airport modification will not significantly impair parkland. The
utilization of Part 150, however, is unfounded and should be abandoned.
As the Allison court elucidated in the case involving Denver's Stapleton
Airport,20 5 the use of Part 150 by the FAA, and the reliance on Part 150 by the
judiciary, is inappropriate in § 4(f) cases. Part 150 "prescribes the procedures,
standards, and methodology governing the development, submission, and
review of airport noise exposure maps and airport noise compatibility programs. 20 6 At Appendix A of Part 150, the FAA outlines its "Land Use Compatibility Table," which lists several categories of land uses and the
recommended maximum decibel level with which those categories are compatible.20 7 Of the twenty-four categories listed, three are routinely discussed by
courts when determining whether or not a noise increase caused by a transportation project will constitute a "use" under § 4(f).208 Those three are (1)nature
exhibits and zoos, (2) amusements, parks, resorts, and camps, and (3) golf
20 9
courses, riding stables, and water recreation.
210National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321, et al. (West 2003).
202 See PLATER ET AL, supra note 50, at 647.
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204
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14 C.F.R. § 150.1 (2003).
Id. at app. A, tbl. 1.
See discussion supra Parts III.B.3, IV.B.2, and IV.C.
14 C.F.R. § 150.1, app. A, tbl. 1 (2003).

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:613

These do not incorporate all of the types of lands meant to be protected
under § 4(f). The Allison court determined that wildlife refuges did not fall
under any of these categories. 2" ° Similarly, the court in Grapevine intimated
that historic parks, which serve the purpose of replicating rural life from a quieter time, do not fall under any of the Part 150 categories. 2 '' Courts in future
cases should extend that reasoning and ignore Part 150 when rationalizing the
relationship between noise and § 4(f). The word "park," which is sandwiched
between "amusements," and "resorts", cannot be read to only include national
parks of such importance as Grand Teton.21 2 Given Congress' mandate to protect sensitive land, judicial reliance on Part 150 in any § 4(f) case is highly
dubious and must be abandoned.
The suspect nature of Part 150 becomes even more apparent when compared with a similar regulation promulgated to interpret § 4(f) in highway
cases. Federal Highway Administration regulations, unlike the FAA's Part
150, directly interpret § 4(f) in the context of a constructive use due to noise.23
The regulation states, in pertinent part:
The administration has reviewed the following situations and determined that a constructive use occurs when ... [t]he projected noise level increase attributable to the
project substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of a noise-sensitive facility of a resource protected by section 4(f), such as hearing the performances at an
outdoor amphitheater, sleeping in the sleeping area of a campground, enjoyment of a
historic site where a quiet setting is a generally recognized feature or attribute of the
site's significance,
or enjoyment of an urban park where serenity and quiet are signif2 14
icant attributes.

If the same regulation applied in airport cases, campgrounds like those at
Grand Teton or McNee Ranch state park, or historic sites like those near Hanscom Field, would likely be considered "used" by intrusive noise.
Beyond the issue of whether Part 150 is substantively sound, an argument
could also be made that the Department of Transportation and the FAA are not
the proper agencies to set noise criteria where parklands are involved. Their
area of expertise is arguably confined to the construction and implementation
of the nation's transportation infrastructure. As such, their purpose inherently
conflicts with the protection of the environment. A far more logical zpproach
would be to give the Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture,
or even the Environmental Protection Agency the responsibility for setting
noise standards. The purposes of these agencies parallel the purposes of § 4(f).
Therefore, courts should look to the noise standards adopted by these agencies,
where they exist, to determine whether a constructive use of parkland - especially federal parkland - would occur as a result of a proposed airport. Such
review would be more faithful to the plain meaning of § 4(f), which provides
that
z the significance of the parkland is determined by the agency administering
it.i215

See discussion supra Part IV.B.2 (Allison v. Dep't of Transp., 908 F.2d 1024, 1029
(D.C. Cir. 1990)).
211 See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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C.

Legislative Intervention

Changes in the way the judiciary reviews § 4(f) airport cases may not be
the only solution to this paradoxical problem. Congressional intervention could
be used in several ways to better effectuate the protection of parklands from the
intrusions of airports. For instance, Congress could force the FAA to discontinue its reliance on Part 150 when assessing the potential noise impacts of
proposed airport expansions. Through legislation, Congress could mandate the
use of Federal Highway Administration regulations interpreting § 4(f), which
are far more environmentally friendly than Part 150.216
Even more effective would be legislative adoption of those standards for
determining whether a constructive use has taken place in § 4(f) highway cases.
Congress could codify case law defining exactly what is and what is not2 17a
constructive use. The "significance of the impact" test from Adler v. Lewis
could be limited to its intended use by an amendment to § 4(f) that simply
states something along the lines of the following:
The prior significance and enjoyment of the park in question shall not be the sole
factor in determining whether a constructive use would occur; the cumulative effect
of prior adverse impacts on the parkland must be considered when assessing whether
a constructive use will occur.
VI.

CONCLUSION AND PREDICTION FOR THE FUTURE

Given the disparities in judicial and regulatory interpretation of constructive use between airport and highway cases, it should come as no surprise that
disparities exist in the dispositions of airport and highway cases. The disparity
has created a completely irreconcilable jurisprudence between the two branches
of § 4(f) case law. On the one hand, highway cases honor the Congressional
mandate inherent in § 4(f). On the other, airport cases deviate significantly
from Congressional intent. To remedy the situation, courts should begin using
the same broad, liberal construction of § 4(f) employed in highway cases in the
disposition of airport cases. They should also reject Part 150 as a legitimate
means of determining whether increased noise levels constitute constructive
uses. If the judiciary fails to correct the paradox on its own, legislative intervention may be needed.
The next chance to correct the judiciary's perversion of the term "use"
may come in the form of a suit over the development of Las Vegas' second
major airport in the Ivanpah Valley, located near the Mojave National Preserve.
The facts surrounding the proposed airport may be more compelling, in terms
of implementing the protections of § 4(f), than those of any airport case adjudicated under the Department of Transportation Act to date. Unlike the Jackson
Hole Airport, this airport would be brand new, so adverse effects on the preserve could not be disregarded by comparing the preserve pre-airport and postairport. Additionally, no other sources of noise exist that could compare to an
airport. Therefore, proponents of the airport will be less able to argue that the
noise generated by the airport will be "insignificant." Only time will tell if a
2I6 See discussion supra Part V.B.
217 See discussion supra Part III.
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case will be filed to oppose this proposed airport. If a "use" could be established, however, local authorities, for the first time in a § 4(f) airport case,
could be forced to meet the requirements of the statute: to prove that no prudent
and feasible alternative to the site exists and to list all measures that will be
taken to minimize the environmental impact on the preserve.
As the air transportation system in the United States continues to grow,
courts may be required to reinterpret their § 4(f) jurisprudence. A correction in
judicial interpretation of the "use" element in cases involving conflicts between
air transportation projects and environmentally sensitive parklands may be, and
hopefully will be, just around the corner.

